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CONSERVATION FORCE ET AL. v. DELTA AIR 
LINES: THE LEGALITY OF AN AIRLINE BAN ON 
BIG GAME HUNTING TROPHIES 
 
Daniel Spivey* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Big game hunting is a sport that has been around for hundreds of 
years. In today’s day and age, hunters are willing to pay exorbitant 
amounts of money in order to obtain hunting permits to legally hunt 
in Africa.  For the most part, this is a practice that has existed 
peacefully for many of years.  However, the practice was brought to 
light in July 2015 when a hunter, from Minnesota, shot and killed 
one of Zimbabwe's most celebrated lions.1  In response, the sport was 
made very well known and the public was outraged, not only with 
the hunter, but also, with the sport in general.2 Soon enough, pressure 
was applied on large corporations to try and curtail the practice in 
any way that they could.3 The public began to look to airlines for a 
response because the airlines were the ones who were transporting 
the trophies back to the U.S. As a result, all three of the U.S. legacy 
carriers – American, Delta, and United – decided to ban the transport 
of big game hunting trophies aboard their airplanes.4   
Ever since the airlines were deregulated with the Aviation 
Deregulation Act of 1978, it has become much harder to challenge an 
airline on one of its services or lack thereof.5 However, a group of 
Plaintiffs are attempting to challenge the Delta Airlines ban on big 
game hunting trophies in the Northern District of Texas. This is an 
issue of first impression for the court because there are no cases that 
challenge the legality of an airline's embargo on a specific piece of 
 
* J.D. Candidate, DePaul University College of Law, 2017; B.S. Professional Flight Technology, 
Purdue University, 2013. Daniel Spivey was born and raised in Los Angeles, California. He currently 
serves as a Research Staff Writer for DePaul Journal of Sports Law & Contemporary Problems and is 
currently focusing on aviation law. He has received all of his pilots licenses. 
1  Reynard Loki, The Bigger Story Behind the Killing of Cecil the Lion That the Media Overlooked, 
ALTERNET (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.alternet.org/environment/bigger-story-behind-killing-cecil-
lion-media-overlooked. 
2  Id. 
3  Id. 
4  Id. 
5  See 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). 
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cargo in the modern era. This Article will discuss the various hurdles 
that the Plaintiffs will have to overcome in order to convince the 
Court that Delta acted unlawfully.6 
II. BACKGROUND 
Cecil the Lion was a male Southwest African lion that lived 
primarily in the Hwange National Park in Matabeleland North, 
Zimbabwe.7 The lion was a major attraction at the park and was 
being tracked by the University of Oxford as part of a larger study.8 
On July 2, 2015, Cecil the Lion was hunted and killed by Dr. Walter 
Palmer.9 In the days after news broke of the killing, there was large 
public outcry over the sport-hunting industry as a whole.10 One of the 
industries that felt pressure from the public was the aviation industry 
because the airlines would commonly transport the hunting trophies 
back to the United States.  
In response to this public pressure, on August 4, 2015, all three 
major U.S. airline carriers decided to ban the transport of lions, 
leopards, elephants, rhinoceros’ and buffalo killed by trophy 
hunters.11 Delta Airlines’ ban was the most significant because it is 
the only American airline to fly directly between the United States 
and South Africa.12 Shortly after the Cecil the Lion incident, but 
prior to any U.S. airline ban, South African Airways had placed its 
own embargo; however, this ban was lifted two weeks later after 
agreeing to tighter inspections.13 In the international community, 
airlines such as British Airways, KLM, Singapore Airways, 
Lufthansa, Air Emirates, Iberia Airlines, IAG Cargo, and Qantas had 
already implemented bans by the time that Delta decided to institute 
its ban.14   
 
6 This Article does not address standing or damages. 
7 Marc Dorian et. al., What Happened in the Harrowing Hours Before Cecil the Lion Was Killed, ABC 
NEWS (Aug. 13, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/International/happened-harrowing-hours-cecil-lion-
killed/story?id=33044279. 
8  Id. 
9  Id.  
10  Loki, supra note 1.  
11  Major U.S. Airlines end trophy hunter shipments after Cecil outcry, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2015), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-zimbabwe-wildlife-airlines-idUSKCN0Q90KT20150804. 
12  Id. 
13  Id.  
14  Samantha Mathewson, Airlines Ban Hunting “Trophies” Onboard, NATURE WORLD NEWS 
(Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.natureworldnews.com/articles/16201/20150821/airlines-ban-hunting-
trophies-onboard.htm. 
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There is little question that Delta Airlines is a “common carrier.”  
A common carrier is one that holds itself out to the public as being 
willing to transport persons or property for compensation, to the 
extent that its facilities permit.15 Commercial airline companies 
flying passengers for hire on regular schedules over definite routes 
have ordinarily been deemed common carriers.16 The controlling 
factor when determining whether a carrier is a “common carrier” is 
whether the carrier holds out its profession to the public generally, by 
words or by course of conduct, as to the services offered or 
performed for compensation, and undertakes to carry for all people 
indifferently.17  
As a common carrier, there are two ways in which Delta Airlines 
is regulated: through federal statute, such as the Airline Deregulation 
Act of 1978 (“ADA”) or the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (“FAA”), 
and via federal common law.  In order for a plaintiff to bring a claim 
against a common carrier, they must have a right under federal 
statute or federal common law.  The Supreme Court has made it clear 
that federal common law causes of action continue to exist when a 
federal rule of decision is “necessary to protect uniquely federal 
interests.”18 The court in Sam L. Majors Jewelers vv. ABX, 
Incorporated, found that when deregulating the airlines under the 
ADA, Congress chose not only to repeal federal common law in 
“clear” and “explicit” language but that it chose the opposite 
course.19 The ADA includes an express provision that preserves 
common law remedies.20 In enacting the ADA, Congress included a 
savings clause that provided “[n]othing in this chapter shall in any 
way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by 
statute, but the provisions of this Chapter are in addition to such 
remedies.”21 Thus, the court validated the idea that federal common 
law can apply to common air carriers. The ADA's preemption 
provision states that:  
 
[e]xcept as provided in this subsection, a State, political 
subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 
 
15  Woolsey v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 993 F.2d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 1993). 
16  73 A.L.R.2d 346, 2 (1978). 
17  Id. at 3a. 
18  Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 926–27 (5th Cir. Tex. 1997) (quoting Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)). 
19  Id. at 928.  
20  Id. at 928. 
21  Id. 
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States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or 
other provision having the force and effect of law related 
to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may 
provide air transportation under this subpart.22  
 
The Supreme Court concluded that the phrase “other provision 
having the force and effect of law” includes common-law claims.23 
The ADA's preemption clause, §1305(a)(1), read together with the 
FAA's saving clause, halts states from imposing their own 
substantive standards with respect to rates, routes, or services, but 
not from affording relief to a party who claims and proves that an 
airline dishonored a term the airline itself stipulated.24 The Supreme 
Court noted: “[t]his distinction between what the state dictates and 
what an airline itself undertakes confines courts in breach-of-contract 
actions to the parties’ bargain, with no enlargement or enhancement 
based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.”25 This 
means that when an airline has voluntarily chosen to agree to certain 
terms or conditions, the court must look strictly at the agreement and 
not outside of it.  Additionally, in another case, the Supreme Court 
held that the key phrase “related to” expresses a “broad pre-emptive 
purpose.”26  
A private plaintiff has the right to bring suit under a federal statute 
only if Congress created that right.27 The FAA does not contain an 
express private right of action to enforce §41310(a).  In Cort  v. Ash, 
the Supreme Court created a four factor test to determine whether a 
statute creates a private cause of action: 
1.   whether the statute creates a federal right in favor of the 
plaintiff; 
2.   whether there is any indication of legislative intent, 
explicit or implicit, either to create or deny a remedy; 
3.   whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of 
the legislative scheme to imply a remedy; 
4.   whether the cause of action is one that is traditionally 
 
22  49 U.S.C.S. § 41713(b)(1) (1997).  
23  Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1430 (2014). 
24  Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232–33 (1995). 
25  Id. at 233. 
26  Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992). 
27  Alexander v Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). 
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relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of 
the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a 
cause of action based solely on federal law.28 
As discussed later in this Article, the Supreme Court's decision 
in Alexander v. Sandoval would make it more difficult for 
federal courts to recognize an implied right of action.  
A. Conservation Force v. Delta 
The case that this article focuses on is Conservation Force et al. v. 
Delta Airlines, Inc.29 This case was brought in the Northern District 
of Texas by a group of Plaintiffs claiming various injuries as a result 
of Delta Airlines’ ban on hunting trophies. 
 1. The Parties 
The first Plaintiff, Conservation Force, is a non-profit 501(c)(3) 
public foundation formed for purposes of conserving wildlife and 
wild places.30 Conservation Force's member-supporters are hunter-
conservationists (both individuals and organizations) who engage in 
user-pay, regulated, sustainable hunting, and then import trophies 
back to the U.S.31 Conservation Force works closely and represents 
the safari hunting operators who provide anti-poaching support, and 
local communities who live with wildlife and benefit from its 
sustainable use.32 It serves the public through support and 
development of conservation infrastructure locally, nationally, and 
internationally.33 The Plaintiffs, Dallas Safari Club (“DSC”), 
Houston Safari Club (“HSC”), and Corey Knowlton, are all member 
supporters of Conservation Force.34  
The second Plaintiff, DSC, is a non-profit conservation, education, 
and hunter advocacy organization based in Dallas, Texas.35 It is a 
membership organization that represents thousands of individual 
 
28  Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
29  Conservation Force’s Compl., Conservation Force et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No 15-cv-3348 
(filed N.D. Tex. October 15, 2015) [hereinafter Conservation Force Compl.]. 
30  Id. at ¶ 13.  
31  Id.  
32  Id.  
33  See Corporate Description, CONSERVATION FORCE, 
    http://www.conservationforce.org/#!home/mainPage (last visited Apr. 30, 2016). 
34  Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶ 13. 
35  Id. at ¶ 14. 
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hunters and service businesses including hunting operators, who 
support the user-pay, sustainable use-based programs.36 About sixty 
percent of its members live outside of Texas.37 The group also 
spends one million dollars, annually, on lobbying efforts and wildlife 
projects, such as genetic studies of lions.38 Its mission is to conserve 
wildlife and wilderness and to promote the interests of hunters 
worldwide.39  
The third Plaintiff, HSC, is a 501(c)(4) non-profit, volunteer 
organization whose mission is to preserve the sport of hunting 
through education, conservation and protection of hunters’ rights.40 
HSC’s members are largely African safari hunters and related service 
providers, including hunting operators.41 Since 1972, HSC has 
provided millions of dollars for conservation, education, and sporting 
rights initiatives worldwide to ensure the longevity of the sport and 
the sustainability of sporting resources.42 
The fourth Plaintiff, Corey Knowlton, is a hunter-conservationist 
domiciled in Texas, a life member of DSC, and a supporting member 
of Conservation Force.43 In May 2015, he hunted a black rhino in 
Nambia.44 To participate in the hunt, he paid $350,000 to Nambia’s 
Game Products Trust Fund, which is funded exclusively for black 
rhino protection and recovery.45 Delta refused to ship Mr. 
Knowlton's trophy back from Southern Africa.46 
The Defendant, Delta Air Lines, Inc., is a Delaware corporation 
that does business in the Northern District of Texas.47 It is an 
international airline that is headquartered and domiciled in Atlanta.48 
Delta flies directly to South Africa and, through its alliance partners, 
 
36  Id.  
37  See Corporate Description, CONSERVATION FORCE, 
    http://www.conservationforce.org/#!home/mainPage (last visited Apr. 30, 2016). 
38  Jeff Mosier, Dallas Safari Club Developing Into A National Powerhouse, DALLAS NEWS (Jan. 7, 
2016), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/metro/20160106-dallas-safari-club-developing-into-national-
powerhouse.ece. 
39  Our Mission, DALLAS SAFARI CLUB, https://www.biggame.org/who-we-are/our-mission/ (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2016). 
40  See generally Houston Safari Club, http://www.houstonsafariclub.org/ (last visited Apr. 30, 2016). 
41  See Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶ 15.  
42  See generally HOUSTON SAFARI CLUB, http://www.houstonsafariclub.org/ (last visited Apr. 30, 
2016); Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶ 15. 
43  Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶ 16.  
44  Id.  
45  Id.  
46  Id.  
47  Id. at ¶ 19.  
48  Id.  
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to Tanzania and Zimbabwe.49 
2. The Allegations 
In count one of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Delta had 
violated its duties as a common carrier under federal common law 
for discriminating against cargo.50 The Plaintiffs claimed that the 
principle of a common carrier is made clear in case law, the 
definitions of “interstate air transportation” and foreign air 
transportation,51 and the prohibitions on discriminatory practices.52   
In count two of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that before 
Delta imposed its embargo, there was a reasonable probability that 
the Plaintiffs and the members they represented would have entered 
into business relations with third parties.53 The hunter-
conservationists represented here, such as Mr. Knowlton, would have 
entered into business relationships for hunting safaris; professional 
hunters and communities would have offered and sold those safaris 
and conducted them; wildlife ministries would have granted licenses 
and other hunting permits; and the communities would have 
benefitted as a result.54 The Plaintiffs alleged that Delta's embargo is 
independently tortious and unlawful.55  
In count three of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that Delta 
has failed to comply with federal regulations requiring that it update 
the FAA about information regarding carriage exclusions, such as the 
Big Five trophy embargo.56 Count three further alleged that Delta has 
violated the conditions of its air carrier certificate by defying national 
and international law, and that it should cease to operate flights.57 
Every flight that Delta currently operates is in violation of 49 U.S.C. 
§ 44711, which prohibits a person from operating as an air carrier in 
violation of a term of its air carrier certificate.58 
 
49  Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶19.  
50  Id. at ¶¶ 62–63. 
51  See 49 U.S.C. § 40102 (2012).  
52  See 49 U.S.C. § 41310 (2000); see also Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶¶ 62–63. 
53  See Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶¶ 68–69. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. at ¶ 70. 
56  Id. at ¶¶ 73–74. 
57  Id.   
58  Id.  
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 III. ANALYSIS 
A. Whether Delta Violated Its Duties As A Common Carrier 
Today, common carriers, especially air carriers, are mostly 
governed by a statutory scheme.  The Aviation Deregulation Act of 
1978 substantially deregulated the industry and statutorily prescribed 
certain aspects of the industry that were not to be regulated.59 In 
order for Delta to violate its duty as a common carrier, it must have 
violated either federal common law or a statute prohibiting 
discrimination against cargo.60 Further, in order for this duty to be 
challenged, the Plaintiffs must have had a recognized cause of action 
either through statute or common law.61 Therefore, there must have 
been a common law remedy under the ADA for a cause of action to 
arise.62 The first part of this section will examine federal common-
law as it pertains to air carriers and the second part of this section 
will examine the relevant statutes.  
1. Common Carrier Duties Under Federal Common Law 
This section will discuss the duties that are imposed on airlines, 
under federal common-law, as they relate to shipping cargo.  
Commercial airlines flying passengers for hire on regular schedules 
over definite routes ordinarily have been deemed to be common 
carriers.63 Common carriers are bound to receive all goods offered by 
the owners or their agents for transportation and to carry them for a 
just compensation to the agreed destination or place of delivery on 
the carrier's line or route.64 This duty only applies when the goods 
are such as the airline undertakes to carry for the public, or of a kind 
coming within the class which they usually carry in the course of 
their employment.65  
 A common carrier of goods is not obliged to receive and 
 
59  See Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1997) (The court found that 
the plaintiff's action did not arise under a federal statute so it looked to federal common law.). 
60  See id. 
61  See id.  
62  See id. at 928.  
63  8A Am. Jur. 2d Aviation § 59 (2015). 
64  46 Am. Jur. 2d Carriers § 277 (2015). 
65  Id.  
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transport all kinds of goods that may be offered for carriage.66 Its 
obligation to carry is coextensive with and limited by its public 
profession as to the kinds of goods it is carrying.67 Accordingly, a 
common carrier of goods may refuse to receive and transport goods 
that are not of the kind it undertakes or is accustomed to carry for the 
public.68 The obligation to transport property of which the carrier 
usually carries, if offered with reasonable compensation, comes from 
the circumstance that a common carrier is a public servant offering a 
service, not just for revenue, but also for the convenience and 
accommodation of the community.69 A carrier may adopt reasonable 
rules and regulations by giving notice to shippers, who must then 
comply with the rules and regulations, before they can hold the 
carrier responsible for a refusal to transport.70 A carrier may 
determine whatever terms and conditions it chooses upon the 
transportation of property of which it is under no legal obligation to 
carry.71 The basic responsibility of a common carrier is to “make no 
distinction in providing transportation for those who apply for it.”72 
It may not accommodate one person and arbitrarily refuse another 
person.73 In York Co. v. Central Railroad, the Supreme Court 
elaborated on the duties of a common carrier: 
 
The law prescribes the duties and responsibilities of the 
common carrier. He exercises, in one sense, a public 
employment, and has duties to the public to perform. 
Though he may limit his services to the carriage of 
particular kinds of goods, and may prescribe regulations 
to protect himself against imposition and fraud, and fix a 
rate of charges proportionate to the magnitude of the 
risks he may have to encounter, he can make no 
discrimination between persons, or vary his charges 
from their condition or character. He is bound to accept 
all goods offered within the course of his employment, 
and is liable to an action in case of refusal. 74 
 
66  Id. § 289. 
67  Id.   
68  Id. § 277. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. § 280.   
71  Id.  
72  13 Am. Jur. 2d § 227 (citations omitted). 
73  Id. 
74  York Co. v. Cent. R.R., 70 U.S. 107, 112 (U.S. 1866) (Plaintiff filed suit for damages relating to the 
destruction of his cotton shipment, which was destroyed while in the care of the common carrier 
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The Supreme Court has also held that “a party engaging in the 
business of a common carrier is bound to treat all shippers alike and 
can be compelled to do so.”75 In American Trucking Ass'ns, 
Incorporated Inc. v. Atchinson, the Supreme Court upheld an 
Interstate Commerce Commission's (“ICC”) rule that forced railroads 
to carry trailers for their competitor motor carriers at the going rate.76 
There, the Court recognized that “[f]rom the earliest days, common 
carriers have had a duty to carry all goods offered for transportation” 
and  that “[r]efusal to carry the goods of some shippers was 
unlawful.”77 The Court went on to note that the railroads may not 
offer services for transporting trailers or for other shippers and then 
deny that service to motor carriers.78 Further, the Court noted that the 
“duty of equal treatment as a common carrier is comprehensive; 
there are no implied exceptions.”79 The fact that a person may be a 
competitor does not allow a common carrier to discriminate.80  
a. Arguments Advanced by the Parties  
In its response to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, Delta cited to case law 
showing that federal common law permits a common carrier by air to 
adopt a cargo policy under which the carrier can refuse to accept 
certain types goods.81 The Seventh Circuit held that if a shipper 
wanted to ship a package with an actual value of more than $50,000, 
then UPS was entitled to refuse acceptance of that package as a 
business decision.82 The court further held that a common carrier is 
not “obliged to accept every package” and noted that, according to 
UPS's tariff, the company also rejects “poorly wrapped packages, 
human body parts, animals, currency, and negotiable instruments.”83 
Delta also cited B.J. Alan Co. v. ICC, where a group of shippers 
challenged a UPS tariff that prohibited the transport of common 
 
defendant.).  
75  Mo. P. R. Co. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 620 (U.S. 1909) (dispute arose over a 
common carrier rail company refusing to transfer rail cars to plaintiff).  
76  Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Atchinson, 387 U.S. 397, 400–01, 413 (1967).  
77  Id. at 406.  
78  Id. at 407. 
79  Id.  
80  Id.  
81  Delta’s Mot. to Dismiss at 7, Conservation Force et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No 3:15-CV-03348-
M, 7 (filed N.D. Tex. December 21, 2015) [hereinafter Delta’s Mot. to Dismiss] 
82  Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. U.P.S., Inc., 474 F.3d 379, 386 (7th Cir. 2007).  
83  Id.  
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fireworks.84 The court stated that the “key showing for a carrier, 
when it deletes a class of goods from the scope of its operations is 
inordinate operational burdens on the carrier's side, with hardship to 
the shippers an offsetting consideration.”85 The court held that UPS 
could prohibit the transport of fireworks because the transportation 
of fireworks notably hampered UPS’ efficient operation.86 
In response to Delta's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
Plaintiffs cited to a Supreme Court case, where a plaintiff challenged 
a common carrier for discrimination on the basis of goods being 
shipped.87 The Court held that “a common carrier not only is obliged 
to receive and carry such goods as he is able to carry and customarily 
does carry, but he is required to carry for all patrons alike; in 
applying an equal right to have their goods transported in the order of 
their application.”88  The Court stated that the essential principle of 
the requirement of common carriers is that they carry the goods of all 
persons, with no unjust preference, unless they physically cannot 
carry the goods.89 The Court also went on to note that the steamship 
company could stop carrying a particular commodity or become a 
special carrier, not a common carrier, but as long as it was a common 
carrier, it must follow common carrier rules.90   
Both Delta and the Plaintiffs cite to Missouri Pacific Railway Co. 
v. Larabee Flour Mills Co., in which Missouri Pacific engaged in the 
business of transferring cars for all companies except the mill 
company.91 In that case, the Supreme Court held that “[w]henever 
one engages in that business the obligation of equal service to all 
arises, and that obligation, irrespective of legislative action or special 
mandate, can be enforced by the courts.”92 The Supreme Court 
affirmed the notion that common carriers must treat all potential 
customers the same and that the courts can enforce that right.93  
It is apparent from the case law that common carriers have a duty 
 
84  B.J. Alan Co. v. ICC, 897 F.2d 561, 562 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (this case was a challenge to motor carriers 
not air carriers).  
85  Id. at 563.  
86  Id. at 565.  
87  Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s Mot., Conservation Force et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 
No 3:15-cv-3348 (filed N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s 
Mot.] (citing Ocean S.S. Co. v. Savannah Locomotive Works & Supply Co., 63 S.E. 577, 578 (Ga. 
1909)). 
88  Id. at 579. 
89  Id. at 580. 
90  Id.  
91  211 U.S. 612, 619 (1909). 
92  Id. at 619–20. 
93  Id. 
  
2016] BIG GAME HUNTING TROPHIES 119 
 
to treat all shippers equally and to not discriminate against any would 
be shippers. This federal common law doctrine was well established 
before the ADA was enacted; thus, according to the ADA's savings 
clause, if the Plaintiffs can prove that there was a breach of this duty, 
then they will have a cause of action that is not pre-empted. The 
main determination for the court will be to decide whether this is a 
type of discrimination meant to be protected by federal common law. 
A full discussion on this question will be addressed later in this 
Article.  
2. Relevant Statutory Provision  
As mentioned earlier, much of the obligations imposed on air 
carriers are done via federal statutes. The relevant statute, as it 
pertains to this lawsuit, is 49 U.S.C. § 41310(a). This statute states 
that “an air carrier or foreign air carrier may not subject a person, 
place, port, or type of traffic in foreign air transportation to 
unreasonable discrimination.”94 Accordingly, a plaintiff has the right 
to bring suit under a federal statute only if Congress created that 
right.95 Congress can create a private right of action either expressly 
or by implication.96 The FAA does not contain an express private 
right of action to enforce §41310(a), thus this section will examine 
whether there is an implied cause of action. 
a. Previous Statute 
In order to fully understand §41310(a), it is important to see how 
§404(b), the provision that §41310(a) was adapted from, of the FAA 
was handled.97 The federal courts are in agreement that while the 
FAA does not provide a private remedy for violation by an air carrier 
of the discrimination provisions, a private civil action may, in an 
appropriate case, be implied.98 Where the injury caused by the 
carrier's conduct appears to fall within the scope of the FAA’s 
purpose to provide adequate air transportation without unreasonable 
preferences or unjust discrimination, the courts hold the case 
 
94  49 U.S.C. § 41310(a). 
95  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). 
96  Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 925 (5th Cir. 1997). 
97  § 404(b) was codified as 49 U.S.C §1374(b).  
98  Availability of private civil action for violation of § 404(b) of Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 
U.S.C.A. § 1374(b)), 41 A.L.R. Fed. 532, 3a (prohibiting discrimination by airline). 
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appropriate for a private remedy.99 In determining whether or not 
private right of action should be implied from 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b), a 
court should look to the four factors mentioned earlier from Cort v. 
Ash.100  
In Polansky v. TransWorld Airlines, Inc., the court considered the 
Cort factors to determine whether there was a private remedy in 49 
U.S.C. § 1374.101 The court stated that “[a]lthough §1374(b) is silent 
about private enforcement, courts have implied a private remedy for 
a variety of acts by the air carrier, including racial discrimination, 
and bumping in violation of the airline's own standards.”102 In the 
court's view, each new category of conduct alleged to violate 
§1374(b) “must be tested against the standards stated by the Supreme 
Court in Cort v. Ash.”103 This court reasoned that the statute was 
aimed to protect the right of air access to air facilities from 
discriminatory interference by the air carrier.104 The court cited other 
areas of the FAA to indicate that the purpose of the Act is: “[t]he 
promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service by air 
carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discriminations, undue 
preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive 
practices.”105 In this instance, the court found no private right under 
the circumstances because the plaintiffs only suffered “inferior 
accommodations” and not “discriminatory denial of access to air 
facilities.”106 
In Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
airline violated the discrimination provision of the FAA by unjustly 
and unreasonably discriminating against a passenger by giving undue 
and unreasonable preferences to others.107 In Wills v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., a California district court found that the plaintiff was 
unduly prejudiced in that unreasonable preference was given to 
others, since he was one of two tourist passengers forbidden passage 
in favor of first-class passengers who were accommodated by being 
placed in the tourist section of the aircraft.108 The court held that by 
 
99  Id.  
100  422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
101  Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 334 (3d Cir. 1975). 
102  Id. at 335.  
103  Id.  
104  Id.  
105  Id. at 336–37. 
106  Id. at 338; Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s Mot., supra note 87, at 12.  
107  Availability of private civil action for violation of § 404(b) of Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 
U.S.C.A. § 1374(b)), 41 A.L.R. Fed. 532, 4a (prohibiting discrimination by airline). 
108  Wills v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 360, 361–62 (S.D. Cal. 1961). 
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disregarding plaintiff's priority, the airline unjustly and unreasonably 
discriminated against him.109 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
extended protection under §1374 to include non-passengers in Mason 
v. Belieu.110 The court stated that, “[n]ot only must non-passengers 
be included within the class of persons covered by the Act, but the 
injury for which they seek recovery must be an interest protected by 
the statute.”111 However, the court went on to find that there was no 
cause of action for the plaintiff because section 404 was not created 
to assure persons waiting for passengers that they will be assisted 
courteously at information counters.112 Courts have recognized 
implied causes of actions in several other instances as well.113 
b. Current Statute 
Recent cases have shown a split when it comes to deciding 
whether a private right of action exists under the newer §41310(a). A 
District Court in New Jersey found that there was a private right of 
action under §41310(a) and stated, “federal courts have consistently 
held that persons discriminatorily denied access to travel have an 
implied right of action under §404(b) of the FAA, the statutory 
predecessor to 49 U.S.C. § 41310(a).”114 In another recent case, the 
court in the Western District of Wisconsin found that although § 
41310 prohibits air carriers from unreasonably discriminating, it did 
not provide any cause of action for its violation.115  
Delta argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. 
Sandoval116 should be used to rule out any implied right of action 
under § 41310.117 In Sandoval, the Supreme Court held that private 
rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by 
 
109  Id. at 365. 
110  543 F.2d 215, 219–20 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
111  Id.  
112  Id. at 221.  
113  See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 537 (D.C. 1975) (finding cause of action for 
airline overbooking); Archibald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(holding plaintiffs were unjustly and unreasonably discriminated against when they were bumped due to 
overbooking); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499, 501-502 (2d Cir. 1956) 
(finding cause of action for racial discrimination).  
114  DeGirolamo v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., 159 F. Supp. 2d 764, 767 (D.N.J. 2001) 
(alleged discriminatory conduct when airline would not allow Plaintiff to fly unless he bought a ticket 
for an attendant to fly with him).  
115  Williams v. Midwest Express Airlines, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 2d 975, 979 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (passengers 
brought an action claiming the airline unjustifiably excluded them from a flight). 
116  532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
117  Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s Mot., supra note 87, at 16.   
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Congress.118 The Court continued to hold that without statutory 
intent, no cause of action existed and courts were prohibited from 
creating a cause of action, regardless of how desirable it might be as 
a matter of policy or as a matter of compatibility with the statute.119 
The Court stated that “legal context matters only to the extent it 
clarifies text” and that “the interpretive inquiry begins with the text 
and structure of the statute.”120 
3. Right of Action Under the Air Carrier Access Act 
Cases decided before Sandoval found that an implied private right 
of action existed under the Air Carrier Access Act (“ACAA”), a 
statute that also contains an anti-discrimination provision.121 The 
ACAA does not provide for an express private cause of action.122 In 
Shinault v. American Airlines, the court discussed the issue of an 
implied cause of action under the ACAA in depth.123 The court 
affirmed the proposition that courts used §404(b) (the predecessor to 
§41310) of the FAA as a basis for implying private causes of action 
by handicapped individuals against commercial airlines.124 
Ultimately, the court in Shinault found an implied cause of action 
under the ACAA.125 The Eighth circuit also recognized a private 
cause of action in Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.126  
However, after the Sandoval decision, both the Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits ruled against an implied cause of action.127 In Lopez v. 
JetBlue Airlines, the court discussed the impact that Sandoval would 
have on determining an implied cause of action by stating, “after 
Sandoval, if Congress has manifested no intent to provide a private 
right of action, we cannot create one.”128 The court ultimately held: 
 
I find that the ACAA is directed at protecting the rights 
 
118  Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286.  
119  Id.  
120  Id. at 288, 288 n.7.  
121  See 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2003).  
122  Shinault v. Am. Airlines, 936 F.2d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 1991). 
123  Id. 
124  Id. at 801 (citations omitted).  
125  Id. at 804.  
126  881 F.2d 566, 569–70 (8th Cir. 1989).  
127  See Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 2004); Love v. Delta Air 
Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1360 (11th Cir. 2002). 
128  Lopez v. JetBlue Airways, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85457, *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2010) (quoting 
Lindsay v. Ass'n of Prof'l Flight Attendants, 581 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
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of disabled passengers. However, the text does not refer 
to a private right to sue. Moreover, the structure of the 
statutory scheme weighs against the implication of a 
private right of action, as it provides an alternative 
means of vindicating the rights of disabled passengers: 
an administrative enforcement scheme.129  
It is important to remember that although the ACAA is a different 
statute than the FAA, it can still serve as an important guidepost as to 
how courts are going to decide the issue of implied causes of action 
as they relate to the airlines. One would also think that if the courts 
are firm on individuals with disabilities, then they would also be firm 
for claims of discrimination.  
4. Alternative Means to Vindicate Rights 
One of the points that Lopez makes is the availability of alternative 
means to vindicate rights.130 This is in line with the second Cort 
factor, which examines a legislative intent to create or deny a 
remedy.131 In a separate Supreme Court decision, the Court found 
that where a statute contains “elaborate enforcement provisions it 
cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by 
implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens.”132 
Accordingly, it is important to take a look at other remedies that 
private individuals are provided under the FAA.  
First, under §46101(a)(1), “[a] person may file a complaint in 
writing with the Secretary of Transportation” for a person violating 
part of Title 49, Subtitle VII, Part A, which includes §41310(a).133 
The Department of Transportation (“DOT”) is responsible for 
investigating the complaint if there are reasonable grounds for the 
investigation.134 Additionally, the FAA or DOT may commence an 
investigation if it reasonably appears that a person is violating the 
Act.135 If the person is found to have violated the Act, the FAA and 
the DOT may issue an order to compel compliance. Additionally, the 
FAA and the DOT may impose a general civil penalty of up to 
 
129  Id. at 6–7.  
130  Id.  
131  Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). 
132  Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14 (1981).  
133  49 U.S.C. § 46101(a)(1) (2001). 
134  Id.  
135  Id. § 46101(a)(2). 
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$27,500 for statutory violations.136 This enforcement authority is 
backstopped by § 46110(a), which states: 
 
a person disclosing a substantial interest in an order 
issued by the Secretary of Transportation … may apply 
for review of the order by filing a petition for review in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit or in the court of appeals of the United 
States for the circuit in which the person resides or its 
principle place of business. The petition must be filed 
not later than 60 days after the order is issued.137 
 
Second, the Secretary of Transportation may bring a civil action 
against a person to enforce § 41310(a). Further, upon request from 
the Secretary of Transportation, the Attorney General may bring a 
civil action to enforce the statute.138 Violations of § 41310(a) are also 
punishable by criminal fines.139 The Supreme Court held in Sandoval 
that “[t]he express provision of one method of enforcing a 
substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude 
others.”140 Since there are express provisions to enforce the statute, 
Sandoval shows that Congress intended to preclude any others.  
Thus, it would appear that the statutory construction of the FAA 
weighs strongly in favor of the second Cort factor. It will ultimately 
be up to the court to decide whether these provisions are adequate to 
remedy the needs of the Plaintiffs in this particular case. However, it 
is apparent that Congress carefully thought out the administrative 
proceedings under the Act. There has yet to be a case deciding 
whether the remedies provided are enough for a violation of § 41310.  
However, the court in Love v. Delta Airlines stated that “[t]he fact 
that Congress has expressly provided private litigants with one right 
of action – the right to review of administrative action on the courts 
of appeals – powerfully suggests that Congress did not intend to 
provide other private rights of action,” when ruling on a private right 
of action under the ACAA.141  
 
136  Id. § 46301(a)(1)(A); see also 14 C.F.R. § 383.2 (2015).  
137  49 U.S.C. § 46110(a).  
138  Id. § 46107(b)(1)(A).  
139  Id. § 46316.  
140  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001). 
141  Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1357 (11th Cir. 2002). 
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a. Is There an Express Private Remedy? 
The next argument that could be made is that Congress provided 
for an express private remedy under another provision of the 
statutory scheme.142  
 
When Congress has established a detailed enforcement 
scheme which expressly provides a private right of 
action for violations of specific provisions that is a 
strong indication that Congress did not intend to provide 
private litigants with a means of redressing violations of 
other sections of the Act.143  
 Section 46108 provides private plaintiffs a cause of action to 
enforce the requirement in § 41101(a)(1), that an air carrier hold a 
DOT-issues certificate of public convenience and necessity.144 Delta 
argued that the FAA contains an express private right of action that 
does not authorize suits to enforce § 41310.145 The Plaintiffs will 
have a difficult time showing that Congress implied a private right of 
action for one provision when it expressly created one for a different 
provision under the same statutory scheme. 
b. Has There Been Undue Discrimination?  
The biggest hurdle that the Plaintiffs will have to face is what 
constitutes “undue discrimination.” If they cannot carry that burden, 
then the cause of action issues will be moot. A claim for 
unreasonable discrimination will survive when it is alleged and 
proven that the plaintiff's right to fair, equal, and nondiscriminatory 
treatment has been violated.146 Once the plaintiff proves 
discrimination or preference, the burden then shifts to the defendant 
airline to prove how the discrimination was reasonable.147 In 
Archibald, the court recognized that the airline must fill the plane in 
a “reasonable and just manner” in an oversold situation.148 The 
 
142  Delta’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 81, at 22.  
143  Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517, 523 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Diefenthal v. Civil 
Aeronautics Bd., 681 F.2d 1039, 1049 (5th Cir. 1982)).  
144  49 U.S.C. § 46108.   
145  Delta’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 81, at 22. 
146  Mahaney v. Air France, 474 F. Supp. 532, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing Mortimer v. Delta Air Lines, 
302 F. Supp. 276, 281 (N.D. Ill. 1969)).  
147  Archibald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 460 F.2d 14, 17 (9th Cir. 1972). 
148 Id. at 16.  
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outwardly and discriminatory act of bumping may be legitimated by 
proof that the airline adhered to its established policy and that policy 
is reasonable.149 Here, the Complaint alleged that the Plaintiffs have 
a right to equal treatment.150 Delta shipped Big Five trophies from 
Africa up until August 3rd and even refused to bow to a prior petition 
to stop shipping trophies.151 Further, Delta has stopped shipping 
some trophies, even though is continues to ship other trophies.152 
Delta's embargo is aimed at a particular person, place, and type of 
traffic.153 The Plaintiffs also alleged that Delta has continued to carry 
hunting trophies from animals outside of the Big Five.154 
On its face, Delta's embargo treats all shippers alike. As discussed 
earlier, this would not be violating any common carrier duty. Any 
would-be shipper that wants to ship a Big Five hunting trophy will 
not be allowed to do so throughout Delta's fleet. However, it does 
make things slightly more interesting that the only people that would 
want to ship these trophies in the first place are already a niche group 
of people.155  Big-game hunters operate in a separate world from 
weekend deer hunters in the United States.156 The $50,000 fee per 
lion keeps the pastime out of economic reach for most game 
hunters.157 While the ban may apply to any shipper, it is certainly 
targeted at a select group. Whether this constitutes “unreasonable 
discrimination” of the kind meant for protection under the statute 
will be a question for the court to decide.  
c. How Are Airlines Allowed to Reject Cargo?  
 There is an express provision in the FAA that allows airlines to 
refuse cargo. Section 44902(b) states, “subject to regulations of the 
Under Secretary, an air carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air 
carrier may refuse to transport a passenger or property the carrier 
decides is, or might be, inimical to safety.”158 The leading case on 
 
149  Id.  
150  Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s Mot., supra note 87, at 14.  
151  Id. 
152  Id.   
153  Id.  
154  Id. at 21.  
155  “These safari hunts cater to a small but wealthy clientele of big-game hunters, who bring back more 
than 400 lion trophies.” Liam Stack, Big Game Hunting is Also Big Business for Wealthy Few, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/travel/big-game-hunting-cecil-
lion.html?_r=0. 
156  Id.  
157  Id.  
158  49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2001).  
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this issue is Air Line Pilots Assn., Intern. v. Civil Aeronautics 
Board.159 In this case, the Air Lines Pilots Association challenged the 
Civil Aeronautics Board’s (“CAB”) determination to reject the 
airline embargoes of hazardous goods.160 The court stated, “if there is 
carrier objection to the present regulations, the appropriate remedy is 
carrier participation in a rule-making procedure.”161 In one of its 
orders, the CAB noted that it would abrogate its statutory 
responsibilities to the shipping and consuming public if it sanctioned 
“pervasive refusals to carry shipments required by the public.”162 The 
preceding statute to §44902(b) was 49 U.S.C. Appx. § 1511(a) and it 
contained the same language as the present rule.163 The court in Air 
Line Pilots Assn. found that if § 1511(a) provided such a broad 
discretion then there would be no need to seek an embargo in the 
first place.164 The court further found that the embargoes proposed 
could not be characterized as constituting ad hoc determinations by 
carriers.165  Lastly, the court held, 
 
[t]here are rules which apply to the carriage of 
hazardous materials, and it is implicit in these rules that 
such goods, marked, labeled, packaged and stowed in 
accordance with such rules, are not inimical to flight 
safety in the judgment of the agencies charged by the 
Congress with the responsibility of making these 
determinations.166 
In Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, the D.C. 
appellate court held that to the extent that airline carriers have the 
right to choose what they will and will not carry, and for whom, 
depends not only on common law duties of a common carrier but 
also on the obligations imposed by the FAA.167 The court held that 
former 49 U.S.C.S. Appx. § 1511(a) does not embrace blanket 
boycott of certain types of hazardous cargo via either embargo or 
tariff route, but only authorizes ad hoc refusals to carry, such as 
 
159  Air Line Pilots Assn., Intern. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 516 F.2d 1269 (2d Cir. 1975). 
160  Id. at 1273. 
161  Id. at 1274.  
162  Id. at 1275.  
163  The main difference between the two statutes is that the word “passenger” was substituted for the 
word “person.” The only other differences are the omission of words as surplus.  
164  Id. at 1276.  
165  Id.  
166  Id. at 1277.   
167  Id. at 259.  
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where there has been determination that some particular freight for 
some specific reason presents peril to safe flight.168 In other words, 
airlines cannot refuse to transport various items designated as 
dangerous articles by the Federal Aviation Administration, based on 
the statute that gave air carriers permission to refuse to transport 
property it deems inimical to safety.169  
d.  Does the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 Preempt Plaintiffs' 
Claim for  Tortious Interference With Business Relations? 
In count two of the Complaint, the Plaintiffs alleged that they have 
been harmed by Delta in their business relationships.170 The 
Plaintiffs essentially claimed that the various organizations have lost 
out revenue that they otherwise would have made, had Delta’s 
embargo not been in place.171 Regardless of the merit of this claim, 
an examination of the legality in bringing such a claim must be given 
a closer look. The relevant statute at issue reads, 
 
“[e]xcept as provided in this subsection, a State, political 
subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2 
States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or 
other provision having the force and effect of law related 
to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may 
provide air transportation under this subpart.”172 
   
In 1978, Congress amended the FAA after determining that 
efficiency, innovation, low prices, variety, and quality would be 
promoted by reliance on competitive market forces rather than 
pervasive federal regulation.173 Congress enacted the ADA to 
dismantle federal economic regulation.174 To ensure that the States 
would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own, the 
ADA included a pre-emption provision.175 The Court in Morales 
stated, “pre-emption may be either express or implied, and is 
 
168  49 U.S.C. 44902 (case notes). 
169  Propriety of Air Carrier's Refusal for Safety Reasons to Transport Passenger or Property under 49 
U.S.C.A. § 44902(b), 192 A.L.R. Fed. 403, 9. 
170  See Conservation Force Compl., supra note 29, at ¶¶ 68–69 
171  Id. 
172  49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1). 
173  Hodges v. Delta Airlines, 44 F.3d 334, 335 (5th Cir. Tex. 1995). 
174  Id. 
175  Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 378 (1992). 
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compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the 
statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and 
purpose.”176 The Court went on to hold that State enforcement 
actions having a connection with, or reference to, airline rates, 
routes, or services are pre-empted under the statute.177  
The Court in Hodges v. Delta Airlines offered the most widely 
used definition for what “services” means under the statute.178 
“Services” generally represent a bargained-for or anticipated 
provision of labor from one party to another.179 Elements of the air 
carrier service bargain include items such as ticketing, boarding 
procedures, provision of food and drink, and baggage handling, in 
addition to the transportation itself.180 The Court then went on to 
hold that while state actions related to airline services were 
preempted under the statute, it did not displace state tort actions for 
personal physical injuries or property damage caused by the 
operation and maintenance of aircraft.181 In American Airlines v. 
Wolens, the Court held that state-law-based court adjudication of 
routine breach-of-contract claims were permitted under the ADA.182 
e. The Definition of “Services”  
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit further expounded on 
the definition of “services,” specifically in how they relate to airline 
shipping in Tobin v. Federal Express Corporation.183 In that case, 
the Court found that all of the plaintiffs’ common-law claims 
depended on FedEx's “package handling, address verification, and 
delivery procedures.”184 The Court found all of these items to 
“plainly concern the contractual arrangement between FedEx and 
users of its services (those who send packages)” and stated that the 
plaintiff's claims implicated FedEx's services.185 While tortiuously 
undertaken conduct may not itself be a service that would be 
bargained for or anticipated by a consumer, the relevant inquiry is 
 
176  Id. at 383 (citation omitted).  
177  Id. at 384. 
178  Hodges v. Delta Airlines, 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995). 
179  Id. at 336. 
180  Id.  
181  Id. at 338. 
182  Am. Airlines v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219 (U.S. 1995). 
183  Tobin v. Fed. Express Corp., 775 F.3d 448 (1st Cir. 2014). 
184  Id. at 454. 
185  Id.  
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whether enforcement of the plaintiff's claims would impose some 
obligation on an airline-defendant with respect to conduct that, when 
properly undertaken, is a service.186 The most instructive excerpt 
came at the end of Tobin opinion when the Court stated, “[s]o it is 
here: where the duty of care alleged drills into the core of an air 
carrier's services and liability for a breach of that duty could affect 
fundamental changes in the carrier's current or future offerings, the 
plaintiff's claims are preempted by the ADA.”187 Thus, it is clear that 
in the context of a shipping company, the service of shipping would 
qualify under the statute. 
f. Is the Shipment of Hunting Trophies Considered a Service? 
Through case law, it becomes clear that the Plaintiffs’ state-law 
claim for tortious interference with business relations is preempted 
under the ADA.  The first determination that must be made is 
whether Delta's refusal to ship big game hunting trophies would 
constitute a service.  According to the definition given in Hodges, 
most courts should have no problem finding that the answer is yes.  
The “service” being offered or lack thereof is the service of shipping. 
Delta as an airline offers shipping as a service.  Just as Tobin found 
that shipping constituted a service, any court with this matter before 
it would also find that shipping is a “service,” offered by Delta 
Airlines, which would satisfy the definition under the statute.  
The next determination that must be made is whether this clam has 
a “connection to” an airline's “rates, routes, or services.” The answer 
to this seems to be clearly, yes.  The claim arises out of Delta's 
refusal to transport hunting trophies.  If the Plaintiffs were to win this 
suit in court, then Delta would be forced to expand a service that it 
does not already offer.  This is precisely the type of regulation that 
the statute was designed to prevent.  The clear legislative intent 
behind the creation of the statute was the belief that airlines would be 
most efficient if they regulated themselves.  Furthermore, case law 
has shown that this would be outside of Congress’ intent when it 
created the preemption provision.  
However, in the Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s 
Answer, the Plaintiffs’ alleged that the tortious interference claim 
does not challenge Delta's services, but rather “the deceptive and 
defamatory effect of Delta's embargo and its negative impact on 
 
186  Id.  
187  Id. at 456.  
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Plaintiffs' business relations.”188 Plaintiffs’ claimed that they are 
challenging the implication that Big Five Hunters act unlawfully and 
that this public broadcast by Delta's embargo damaged the Plaintiffs' 
business relationships.189 Further, Plaintiffs alleged that both Delta's 
acts and statements bundled lawful Big Five trophies with unlawful 
contraband.190  
The Fifth Circuit spoke directly to this issue and held that tortious 
interference with business relationships is expressly preempted under 
the ADA.191 In that case, a travel agency had an agreement with 
American Airlines in which it was authorized to sell tickets on the 
airline.192 Under a new agreement, the travel agency's commissions 
were cut significantly.193 The travel agency sued American Airlines 
and claimed that the airlines knew that it was going to reduce 
commissions and should have disclosed the impending changes.194 
The court found that the claim involved the airline's dealings with 
customers and that it sought the application of Texas common law in 
a way that would regulate the airline’s pricing policies, commission 
structure and reservation practices.195 The court noted that Wolens 
expressed the ADA's purpose, which was to leave airlines free to 
choose the selection and design of market mechanisms appropriate to 
the furnishing of their transportation services.196 The court held that 
“the carrier's relations with travel agents, as intermediaries between 
carriers and passengers, plainly fall within the ADA's deregulatory 
concerns” and ultimately preempted the plaintiff’s claim.197 
While all of the allegations may very well be true, the case law is 
clear that any claim relating to an airline's “services” will be pre-
empted.  A judge will most likely find in favor of Delta on this claim 
because the ADA preemption provision is “deliberately 
expansive.”198 Therefore, it is clear that the claim for tortious 
interference of business relations cannot stand because Congress, 
under the ADA, expressly preempts it.  
 
188  Conservation Force’s Response to Delta’s Mot., supra note 87, at 19.  
189  Id.  
190  Id.  
191  Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, 283 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 2002). 
192  Id. at 284.  
193  Id.  
194  Id. at 284–85.  
195  Id. at 287.  
196  Id. at 288. 
197  Id.  
198  Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992). 
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g. What Are the Public Policy Implications of a Decision?  
One of the central focuses of the Complaint is the benefit that Big 
Game Hunting provides in Africa, and the public policy implications.  
The Complaint alleged that the benefits include habitat preservation, 
wildlife management, and anti-poaching.199 It also stated that hunting 
fees make up the lion's share of operating budget revenue for 
national and local wildlife authorities, which dedicate the largest 
share of their budgets to rangers and equipment.200 Additionally, the 
Complaint alleges that tourist safari hunting generates funds for 
remote villages where photo tourists do not travel and where the 
local people are most affected by crop-raiding elephants and 
livestock eating lions.201 
It has been estimated that trophy hunting generates revenues of US 
$200 million annually on the African continent.202 The lion 
population in Africa is estimated to be in the range of 35,000 animals 
with about 665 killed as trophies for export every year.203 A report 
prepared by Economist at Large revealed that very little money goes 
to community development.204 The report finds that as little as three 
percent of a Tanzanian hunting company's income goes to the local 
communities that support the bulk of the conservation work.205 
Instead, most of the money goes to companies, government agencies, 
and individuals located internationally or in national capitals.206 Even 
if the Plaintiffs were able to show that the hunting does actually help 
conservation efforts, there are still several hurdles that the Plaintiffs 
will have to overcome for public policy to become a relevant 
consideration in this case.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
It appears that the legal hurdles that the Plaintiffs will have to 
overcome will be too great. The ADA was designed to provide 
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airlines the freedom to make these types of decisions. It will be 
interesting to see how the Texas district court chooses to handle the 
undue discrimination claim, but, because the ban treats all shippers 
alike, the court will most likely find that Delta was within its rights.  
 
